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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the role positive organizational behaviors play in Lessons Learned 
systems in military organizations. The paper is based on the outcomes of the analysis of military 
documentation, the observation method and the opinions of the Lesson Learned personnel of the 
organizations under the study. The case study provides the examples identified in: NATO, the 
U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces. In a natural way, the attention is focused on the organiza-
tions recognized as the key Lessons Learned players in their respective armies/alliance: the NATO 
Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned 
(CALL) and the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and Training Centre (PAF DTC). The scope of the 
analysis includes leadership and the stakeholders’ involvement in capturing observations, sharing 
information and learning from others.
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1. Introduction
The latest research projects conducted in the Department of General Management 
of the Nicolaus Copernicus University have focused on the issues of Knowledge 
Management (Stankiewicz, 2006) and Positive Organizational Scholarship 
(Stankiewicz, 2010). In both cases, “soft” elements such as organizational culture, 
climate and behaviors have been in the center of the researchers’ attention. Within 
the first project, Kalińska (2006: 263-268) identified the following elements of the 
organizational culture and climate having an impact on Knowledge Management 
processes: (1) team orientation and the ability to work in teams; (2) climate of 
mutual trust; (3) climate supporting creativity and experimentation; (4) climate 










failures; (5) orientation to customers; (6) loyalty to a company; (7) informal groups 
in an organization; and (8) tolerance for uncertainty. Glińska-Neweś (2006: 288-
296) enumerated organizational behaviors considered to be particularly important 
for managing knowledge. The catalogue included: (1) leadership, (2) team work; 
(3) internal communication; and (4) attitude to changes and innovation. They were 
discussed in details in her consecutive book on cultural determinants of Knowledge 
Management (cf. Glińska-Neweś, 2007: 85-122). The second project was entirely 
devoted to the Positive Organizational Scholarship approach which emerged 
in the United States a decade ago (cf. Cameron et al., 2003) and has expanded 
throughout the world. The detailed studies on positive organizational potential 
(Glińska-Neweś, 2010a: 37-52; Chodorek, 2010a: 53-74; Chodorek, 2010b: 85-
96), positive organizational culture (Glińska-Neweś, 2010b: 75-105), positive 
organizational climate (Kalińska, 2010: 107-140), positive employees’ behaviors 
(Józefowicz, 2010a: 141-158; Józefowicz, 2010b: 75-84) and relations among 
the aforementioned elements (Haffer, 2010: 159-213) contributed to creating the 
model of managing the intangible resources for the organizational development.
Nevertheless, within both of the projects the emphasis was given exclusively 
to for-profit companies while the other types of organizations did not receive 
enough attention. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to contribute to filling this gap 
and to study the role positive organizational behaviors play in Lessons Learned 
systems in military organizations. The aforementioned aim has determined 
the following operational objectives: (1) to outline the Lessons Learned (LL) 
solutions in selected military organizations; (2) to identify the key success factors 
for Lessons Learned capabilities; (3) to discuss in details the issues of leadership 
and stakeholder involvement in experiential learning processes within studied 
organizations; (4) to develop the concept of further research in this area.
The case study is based on the outcomes of the analysis of military 
documentation, the observation method and the opinions of the Lesson Learned 
personnel from the organizations under the study. The documentation analysis has 
encompassed: doctrines, directives, manuals and handbooks. Observations has been 
captured during national and international events and activities by the author who 
has been the member of the Lessons Learned community in the Polish Armed Forces 
since December 2011. Moreover, the voice of military Lessons Learned experts and 
practitioners has been incorporated in the study. The analysis has included their 
opinions and insights expressed publicly in documents, addressed officially to the 
training audience and shared in interviews. The case study provides the examples 
identified in: NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces. In a natural way, 
the attention is focused on the organizations recognized as the key Lessons Learned 
players in their respective armies/alliance: the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons 
Learned Centre (JALLC), the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and 










The paper is structured into three parts. First of all, the emphasis is focused 
on the assumptions, the model and the key success factors for military Lessons 
Learned capabilities. Secondly, the role of leadership is explored. Thirdly, the 
stakeholders’ involvement in capturing observations, sharing information and 
learning from others is discussed. Finally, within conclusions, the objectives and 
the research problems for further exploration are identified.
2. Military Lessons Learned capabilities
As observed by Jabłoński and Lis (2012b), “learning from prior wars, campaigns 
and battles has always been the force driving the development of military strategy, 
operational art and tactics, and determining the technological advancement of 
armaments and military equipment”. Therefore, military organizations have valued 
experiential learning and they have developed Lessons Learned capabilities in 
order to capture observations, insights and lessons, and to make use of them. In 
accordance with the NATO approach, “[t]he term Lessons Learned is broadly used 
to describe people, things and activities related to the act of learning from experience 
to achieve improvements. The idea of Lessons Learned in an organization is that 
through a formal approach to learning, individuals and the organization can reduce 
the risk of repeating mistakes and increase the chance that successes are repeated. In 
the military context, this means reduced operational risk, increased cost efficiency, 
and improved operational effectiveness” (NATO LL Handbook, 2011: 1). The 
aforementioned explanation of the Lessons Learned nature highlights its role as 
a bridge linking experiential learning (capturing observations and analyzing them) 
with remedial actions aimed at implementing improvements. In order achieve these 
aims, military organizations need to develop their Lessons Learned capabilities 
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As presented above, structures, process and tools constitute the pillars of 
“the NATO Lessons Learned house”. Structures include Lessons Learned staff 
officers and analysts both decentralized and embedded into the headquarters 
and forces as well as concentrated in highly specialized organizations providing 
permanent analysis capabilities such as: the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons 
Learned Centre (JALLC), the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 
or the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and Training Centre (PAF DTC). Generic 
military Lessons Learned processes encompass the following stages: the 
identification of observations, analyses, the implementation of improvements 
and the dissemination of Lessons Learned. The military organizations under the 
study apply a wide range of Lessons Learned tools supporting their organizational 
learning and sharing information. The thorough analysis of the Lessons Learned 
structures, processes and tools in NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed 
Forces is provided by Jabłoński and Lis (2012b).
The NATO Bi-Strategic Command Lessons Learned Directive identifies the 
following Key Success Factors (KSFs) for a Lessons Learned capability: the 
engagement of leaders, positive mindset, willingness to share information and 
stakeholder involvement (Bi-SCD 80-6, 2011, as quoted in NATO LL Handbook, 
2011: 10). As highlighted by one of the interviewed experts, the classification 
derives from the finding of the JALLC analyses on the Lessons Learned process 
and sharing in NATO and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. The KSFs identified 
in these aforementioned projects included: leadership, stakeholder responsibility 
and information assurance.
Discussing the Lessons Learned processes in the Joint Warfare Centre 
(JWC), Sewell (2009: 37) highlights three core guiding principles: cooperation, 
communication and coordination. Cooperation means “the willingness of people 
or organizations to work or act together for a  common purpose or benefit”. 
Communication is “the art or technique of using words effectively to share 
thoughts, information or ideas”. Coordination denotes “the skilful and effective 
interaction of parts into an integrated and harmonious operation”. The aim of all 
the three principles is to provide prerequisite conditions, and to foster procedures 
and organizational behaviors resulting in effective experiential learning and 
sharing Lessons Learned. The impact of the aforementioned principles in remedial 
actions phase is officially recognized in the NATO LL Handbook (2011: 33).
Similarly, positive organizational behaviors are three of four determinants 
of the Lessons Learned system’s effectiveness enumerated in the Polish Armed 
Forces (PAF) LL manual. The triplet includes: „active involvement of commanders 
at all levels of the PAF; soldiers’ and civilian employees’ creative and innovative 
thinking aimed at improving the PAF operations and capabilities; [and the] 
willingness to share lessons learned and to exchange information at all levels of 










The comparative analysis of the military approach and the studies on 
determinants of knowledge management in civilian organizations (cf. Glińska-
Neweś, 2007: 85-122; Kalińska, 2006: 263-268) confirms the significant role 
organizational culture and organizational behaviors play in organizational learning. 
The emphasis on positive organizational behaviors follows the most up-to-date 
trends in the theory and practice of management such as Positive Organizational 
Scholarship which emerged as early as a decade ago (cf. Cameron et al., 2003; 
Stankiewicz, 2010). Therefore, the aim of the following sections is to explore 
the military approach to developing and strengthening positive organizational 
behaviors crucial for Lessons Learned capabilities. The analysis will focus on 
Lessons Learned key success factors identified in NATO and the PAF. The scope 
of the analysis will include leadership and stakeholders’ involvement in capturing 
observations, sharing information and learning from others.
3. The role of leadership in the Lessons Learned capability
Both researchers and practitioners highlight the significance of leadership in 
contemporary organizations. In the armed forces, leadership has always been 
considered as one of the key characteristics of a good commander. Therefore, 
leadership is included into the NATO DOTMPLF-I  categorization used to 
analyze military capabilities. As the Lessons Learned process combines 
experiential learning and continuous improvements, the will and decisions of 
military executives are necessary to put lessons identified and recommendations 
into practice. According to Hallett (2010: 23-24), the active engagement of the 
command leadership in the Lessons Learned activities is necessary to ensure rare 
resources including time and attention. Moreover, strong leadership supporting 
Lessons Learned initiatives is indispensable in order to “foster an institutional 
culture that not only accepts the need for the organizational self-examination that 
underpins a successful Lessons Learned program, but embraces it”. As stated in 
the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, learning from experience 
“requires lessons to […] be brought to the attention of the appropriate authority 
able and responsible for dealing with them. It also requires the chain of command 
to have a clear understanding of how to prioritize lessons and how to staff them” 
(AJP-3(B), 2011: 4.19). Hallet et al. (2009: 43) point out three elements of 
leadership’s role in a Lessons Learned capability: (1) guidance; (2) engagement; 
and (3) promotion.
Commanders’ guidance is necessary to establish the priorities of Lessons 
Learned business, to allocate resources necessary for analysis and remedial 
actions and to involve external stakeholders into projects beyond the capacities 
of the organization (Hallet et al., 2009: 43). According to the Hallet’s further 
studies (2010: 24) the commanders’ guidance is expressed through: (1) providing 










which explain Lessons Learned policies and responsibilities in the specific context 
of the unit or headquarters; (2) prioritizing attention and other rare resources 
throughout the Lessons Learned process; and (3) managing the remedial actions 
phase. Depending on the context and the level of command, the form of the 
commander’s guidance may vary from informal tasking to very formal textual 
regulation. The Prioritized Analyses Requirement Lists used in the NATO Joint 
Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and the Polish Armed Forces Lessons 
Learned system represent a prominent example of official documents expressing 
the commanders’ will and guidance. The Lessons Learned process is time-, effort- 
and resources-consuming activity. Therefore the commanders’ engagement and 
support are indispensable for its success. Only when commanders give top priority 
and personally engage in the Lessons Learned business, the process can get the 
right momentum. Commanders’ engagement is particularly crucial in the remedial 
actions phase. That is the commanders’ responsibility to endorse the action plan, 
to commit resources, and to nominate and task an action body. The U.S. Army 
Lessons Learned Handbook enumerates senior leader involvement at the top of 
requirements for the issue-resolution process which corresponds to the remedial 
action phase in the NATO and Polish models of the Lessons Learned process. 
As highlighted in the aforementioned document: “Senior leader involvement or 
executive-level participation in the issues-resolution process is the key to success. 
Without senior-level leadership involvement with the authority to task agencies 
to work issues and reallocate resources, the process fails. For example, successful 
issues-resolution steps in the U.S. Army required involvement at the three-star 
general officer level. This commander had the ability to task his subordinate two-
star commanders with responsibility for their respective service branches and 
combat development processes to drive changes to doctrine, training, education 
or materiel” (CALL Handbook, 2011: 33-34).
Commanders’ role to promote a  Lessons Learned capability is expressed 
by motivating their subordinates and encouraging the exchange of Lesson 
Learned products with other organizations. Establishing incentives for personnel 
contributing to a Lessons Learned process by capturing observations, identifying 
lessons and sharing their insights is extremely important to overcome the human, 
psychological resistance to externalize own problems and deficiencies. The 
promotion of sharing lessons with other organizations in the chain of command or 
with allied partners is crucial to exploit the effect of synergy and to avoid making 
the same mistakes across organizations (Hallet et al., 2009: 43). As later highlighted 
by Hallet (2010: 25), “Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned sharing increases 
organizational Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) productivity by 
making knowledge available at very low cost in time, money and attention. This 
sharing provides the surplus value of the Lessons Learned system (…)”. Promoting 










improvement, and developing positive organizational culture and organizational 
climate are the other tasks commanders are to fulfill in order to succeed in Lessons 
Learned initiatives. Hallet (2010: 26) suggests to achieve this aim in two steps. 
Overcoming resistance to admitting mistakes and implementing changes is the first 
challenge. Developing the positive incentive system motivating human behaviors 
favorable for learning, sharing knowledge and introducing changes is the second 
one. The shift from counteracting disincentives to encouraging positive aspects 
of experiential learning resembles the assumptions of the two-factor theory of 
motivation developed by Herzberg (cf. Griffin, 2008: 440-441).
Strong leadership, providing guidance and prioritization, personally engaging 
in Lessons Learned processes and promoting experiential learning among 
subordinates, is one of the prerequisites of the efficient Lessons Learned capability. 
As highlighted in the NATO LL Handbook (2011: 4), “true organizational 
learning only takes place when driven by leaders”. The aforementioned statement 
is a short but very precise conclusion of the role of military commanders in the 
Lessons Learned processes.
4. The role of stakeholder involvement in the Lessons Learned capability
As found within the military organizations under the study, the involvement 
of all personnel is the prerequisite for the success of the Lessons Learned 
initiatives. Hallet et al. (2009: 43) highlight that Lessons Learned “is an all-
hands responsibility”. Internal stakeholders play double role in Lessons Learned 
systems. First of all, they are the providers of observations, insights and lessons 
identified, which become the inputs for the organizational learning when submitted 
through Lessons Learned processes. On the other hand, the internal stakeholders 
are the beneficiaries of improvements resulted from Lessons Learned activity and 
identified best practices (cf. NATO LL Handbook, 2011: 3).
Stakeholder involvement in Lessons Learned processes includes: contributing 
to the system by capturing observations, sharing information and learning from 
others. Lessons Learned mindset defined as “a desire to incorporate learning from 
others into all aspects of work as well as the confidence and trust to share own 
learning with others” (NATO LL Handbook, 2011: 10) seems to be the foundation 
of this involvement. Mindset is a prerequisite for an internal knowledge market 
in any organization. Davenport and Prusak (1998: 30-36) notice that effective 
knowledge markets need a commonly accepted price system and trust between 
knowledge sellers and buyers (seekers). Ujwary-Gil (2011: 91) enumerates the 
lack of trust and openness as two fundamental barriers to knowledge sharing. This 
point of view is shared by military organizations, too. The NATO LL Handbook 
(2011: 10) states: “A key issue with information sharing is information assurance: 











As observed by Jabłoński and Lis (2012a: 22), there is a kind of the paradox 
in military lessons Learned systems. Due to their hierarchical and very formal 
structures, it is challenging for military organizations to develop an experiential 
learning culture fostering an initiative and creativity of all members. Therefore, 
buying-in the personnel for the organizational learning and subsequent 
improvements is one of the key roles of leaders and Lessons Learned staff officers. 
As already mentioned, this is the commanders’ responsibility to promote Lessons 
Learned and to develop effective motivation programs in order to involve all the 
personnel. While leaders act as the enablers, Lessons learned staff officers, as 
highlighted in the NATO LL Handbook (2011: 4), are “central to the organization’s 
efforts to engage everybody in seeing the value of learning lessons”.
The development of mindset and organizational culture enhancing information 
and knowledge sharing is a challenging and long-run business. Nevertheless, 
military organizations experienced in managing knowledge and learning processes 
provide inspiring examples of successful solutions in this area. As pointed out 
by one of the experts, the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned has 
experienced three factors crucial for the acceptance for a  Lessons Learned 
programs among soldiers: the After Action Review (AAR) methodology offering 
honest 360-assessment, the non-attribution of lessons to specific units and the 
value of products provided by the learning organization to the force.
The After Action Review is a particularly interesting and valuable solution 
employed in the U.S. Army. The AAR process “conducted after every operation 
played a major role in transforming how the U.S. Army trained and fought after 
the Vietnam War” (CALL Handbook, 2011: 63). As the CALL deputy director 
highlighted during the Lessons Learned Workshops conducted in Bydgoszcz in 
April 2012, repetitive training and the emphasis on positive outcomes were the 
keys to the success of the AAR implementation. In one of his papers, he states: “By 
encouraging free discussion, the AAR permitted subordinates to offer constructive 
criticism of leader decisions in an open forum. The designers of the AAR and 
the Army leadership felt that by allowing subordinates to express their opinions 
openly, the AAR gave the commander the “ground truth” about the performance of 
the unit. This facet of the AAR precipitated a huge culture shift in the U.S. Army, 
which had heretofore frowned upon any questioning of leadership decisions, no 
matter how constructively framed. This culture shift took a while to take hold, but 
was greatly facilitated by the transformation of the Army from a conscript to an 
all-volunteer force following the Vietnam War” (Lackey, 2003: 80).
Discussing the engagement of the leaders and all the personnel, the position of 
Lessons Learned staff officers needs to be recognized and appreciated. They are 
the key players within the Lessons Learned processes. The NATO LL Handbook 
(2011: 4) emphasizes their role in “ensuring the organization is a  Learning 










in ensuring all stakeholders are aware of their responsibilities in the process. 
Finally, it is up to the LLSO to ensure lessons are shared early and widely”. 
A metaphoric explanation of the responsibilities of Lessons Learned staff officers 
in the observation and analysis phase is provided by Jabłoński and Lis (2012c). 
They describe Lessons Learned practitioners as “the ambassadors of the Lessons 
Learned systems in their units”, “creative seekers of observations”, “editors” 
supporting the members of their organizations to write an observation in a relevant 
format and “analysts” verifying observations and then exploring them in-depth. 
Expanding this catalogue, the following roles of Lessons Learned officers’ can be 
identified within remaining phases of the Lessons Learned process: “the monitors 
of remedial actions implementations”, “the editors and disseminators of lessons 
reports and findings” and “the organizational knowledge brokers”. Taking into 
account the multidimensional role played by the Lessons Learned staff officers, 
their motivation, engagement and positive behaviors seem to be crucial to Lessons 
Learned processes in any organization. Their role is extremely important due 
to the fact that in the majority of units and headquarters, there are single posts 
allocated to the full-time Lessons Learned staff officers or the double-hatted 
officers of primary responsibility (OPR) accomplishing Lessons Learned duties 
as their second job.
5. Conclusion and way ahead
Summing up, the examples collected from the NATO, U.S. and Polish military 
Lessons Learned communities confirm the significant role played by positive 
organizational behaviors in experiential learning and organizational improvements 
implementation. Positive attitudes and behaviors of commanders, Lessons 
Learned personnel and all servicemen seem to be the key success factors for 
a Lessons Learned capability. Guidance, engagement in learning processes, and 
promotion of organizational learning and knowledge exchange are the key roles 
of military leaders. Stakeholder involvement expressed in capturing observations, 
sharing information and learning from others is another prerequisite for effective 
Lessons Learned systems.
In effect of the scientific exploration, the new research question arises: how 
to develop and strengthen positive organizational behaviors fostering experiential 
learning in military organizations? In order to operationalize the further survey, 
the following research problems are identified:
What challenges (problems) are (were) faced by Lessons Learned communities 
in military organizations concerning: the engagement of leaders, positive mindset, 
willingness to share information and stakeholder involvement?
What are (were) the solutions to these challenges (problems)? What has 











What other organizational behaviors or the elements of organizational 
culture and climate are stimulants or obstacles to the Lessons Learned capability 
development?
Are there any observations, lessons and best practices on managing 
organizational behaviors which can be exchanged between military organizations 
and other business and non-profit sectors?
The aforementioned research problems will be explored through interviewing 
Lessons Learned experts and practitioners. The survey will be conducted among 
the key personnel of the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, the 
U.S. Army Lessons Learned Center and the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and 
Training Centre. Moreover, the attempts will be made in order to extend the panel 
of experts and to include some representatives of international headquarters and 
other NATO member nations.
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